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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
-vsCRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL,
Defendant & Appellant.

Case No. 14248

APPELLANT'S AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
STATEMENT
Pursuant to stipulation and leave of this Court, and in the light of the case
of Gregg v. Georgia, decided July 2, 1976 by the Supreme Court of the United
States, hereinafter referred to as the Gregg case; and the case of Profit v s .
Florida, decided July 2, 1976 by the Supreme Court of the United States, hereinafter referred to as the Profit case (the citations of which are not available to the
writer); the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell, (hereinafter referred to merely
as "Marvell"), files this amended and supplemental brief.
The original brief herein sets forth the kind of case; the disposition in the
lower court; the relief sought on appeal; a statement of the facts; and conclusion.
Reference to the original brief is made in coverage of these m a t t e r s .
The Appellant Marvell reiterates the argument set forth in Point I and II,
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and many of the observations made in Point III and Point IV a r e pertinent as
Points III and IV are herein supplemented and amended.

The conclusion remains

as in the original brief on file herein.
ARGUMENT
POINT IE
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BY THE COURT WAS IN VIOLATIOI
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, IT BEING CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
In the initial brief submitted herein, on behalf of the Appellant Marvell, the
position was taken in Point III that the imposition of the death penalty by the Court
was in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, it being cruel and unusual punishment. Since the filing of the brief,
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Gregg and Profit cases has held that
the death penalty does not per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
On occasion, it has been said that the Supreme Court of the United States
follows the election r e t u r n s ; and it may now be asserted that the Court follows the
public opinion polls and the legislative enactments of individual States. In the Gregg
case, the Court stated:
!f

Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century,
over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now
evident that a large proportion of American society continue to
regard it as appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.
n

The most marked indication of society T s endorsement of the

[2]
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death penalty for murder is the legislative response to F u r man. The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted
new statutes that provide for the death penalty. 11
However, in its circumambient decision in the Gregg case, as it reviews
its decision in the Furman case, the Court also quotes Chief Justice Warren that
the Eighth Amendment n must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 9, provides that cruel and
unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.

Irrespective of the views expressed by

the majority in the Gregg case, it is within the province of this Court to a s s e r t the
maturity and established high moral principles of the State of Utah, and hold without equivocation and circumambiency that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment and does not accord with the dignity of man and humane justice.
POINT IV

r

SECTION 76-3-207 U . C . A. 1953 SHOULD BE HELD AS NOT CONFORMING TO
LAW, AND THE CAUSE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SENTENCE
OF THE APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
The Utah statute, Section 76-3-207 is a hybrid of the Georgia and Florida
statutes enacted following the Furman decision, but is deficient in its relationship
to the statutes of both of these states as appears from the Gregg and Profit c a s e s .
The Georgia statute, which sets up a bifurcated procedure, as does the
Utah statute, provides guidelines for the jury in its determination of whether or
not it will impose the death penalty for first degree murder. However, the Georgia
statute requires that in the event the jury return a verdict that the sentence shall be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,rsi
may contain errors.

death, it must make a specific finding justifying its conclusion.

If the jury does

impose the death penalty, the Georgia statute further provides for an automatic
review of the sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to safeguard against prejudicial or arbitary factors; to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate
compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases; and whether the imposition of the death penalty is unwarranted.
The Florida statute is similar to the Georgia Statute, except that in Florida
the sentence is determined by the trial judge, the jury acting in only an advisory
capacity, and it being necessary for the trial judge to make written findings supporting the sentence of death. The Florida statute, like the Georgia statute p r o vides for automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida in all cases in which
a death sentence is imposed.

,;i

The Utah Statute, Section 76-3-207, in its bifurcated system, provides that
the presentence hearing be conducted before either the court or jury on the issue of
penalty. There is no requirement that if the jury a r r i v e s at a unanimous verdict
for death, it must detail its reason for such sentence; and there is no requirement
that the court make written findings in the event the hearing is conducted before the
court, and the court imposes the sentence of death. Unlike both the Georgia and
Florida statutes, the Utah statute fails to provide for an automatic review by the
Supreme Court of Utah in the event the sentence of death is imposed.

In both the

Gregg and Profit c a s e s , the Supreme Court of the United States s t r e s s e d the im-
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portance of the mandatory and automatic appelate review system in independently
determing whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is warranted.
As set forth in the initial brief submitted herein on behalf of Marvell under
Point IV, the Furman case decries the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries
in determining whether defendants committing certain crimes should die or be imprisoned.

That situation continues to prevail under Section 76-3-207, U . C . A . 1953,

wherein it is provided that in the further proceedings on the issue of penalty evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence..
As to mitigating circumstances, the statute sets forth some standards; as to aggravating circumstances, no standards a r e set forth, but reference merely made
to Sec. 75-5-292 U. C. A. 1953 wherein is set forth and defined what constitutes
m u r d e r in the first degree. Marvell, along with two other defendants, was charged
in this matter with the crime of murder in the first degree by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Michael Hogan, while he was engaged in the commission,
or attempted commission, or flight after committing or attempting to commit burglary or kidnapping. This charge, standing alone, under the provisions of Sec.
76-3-207 U. C. A. 1953 constitutes the agravating circumstances of this cause - if any other circumstances or standards were considered by the Court in passing
sentence, it has to be under the uncontrolled and untrammelled discretion of the
Court, for no other standard has been legislated to guide Court or jury in a r r i v ing at a conclusion.

[5]
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Under the Georgia statute the presentence hearing is conducted before
whomever made the determination of guilt. As pointed out in the original brief,
in the instant case it was impracticable to conduct the pre-sentence hearing before the jury because of the fact that the Court erroneously insisted upon the selec
tion of a "death-qualified" jury - - a panel of jurors comprised of only those who
would definitely support the penalty of death in the event of conviction. State v s .
Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P2d 519. This situation left the appellants with no
choice but to waive the hearing before the jury and have same held before the Cour
the predilection of which was unknown and could not be determined.
The trial Court in rendering its decision found the m u r d e r to be brutal and
ruthless and without any cause. However, having made such finding, the Court
made the very astute observation that the accused Dunsdon was the only one of the
defendants who had any motive whatsoever. (Rep. T r . pgs. 596 & 646). The Court apparently failed to give consideration to the fact that until the evening of the murder
the accused Dunsdon had never met or known Marvell. (Rep.Tr.pgs. 481 & 596). Ths
the only reason Marvell accompanied Dundson to the residence of the deceased was
to show him where the deceased resided. (Rep. T r . p . 593). The Court found that at
the time of the m u r d e r the capacity of Marvell to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct was not substantially impaired as a result of drugs or intoxication. (Rep,
T r . p . 648). However, in the light of all the testimony, the question necessarily
presents itself whether any man, with no record of violence in his background, in

[6]
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the full possession of his faculties, neither intoxicated nor under the influence of
drugs, would accompany a revengeful stranger whom he had just met, on an e s capade of the murderous character involved in this cause. To answer the question
in the affirmative is to be naive and unrealistic.
The Court's finding that the defendant Dunsdon n had a very vivid recollection
of what happened, n (Rep.Tr.p. 647) and the Court no doubt influenced by the r e p r e sentations made by counsel for the State at the session in chambers ( R e p . T r . p g s .
37-51) when neither Marvell nor his attorney were present, the Court was not only
influenced but accepted the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant Dunsdon, an
accomplice to the c r i m e , who stated that he had struck the victim with brass
knuckles, but it was Marvell who, without evidence of motive or reason, wielded
the rifle of the defendant Codianna, and shot and killed the deceased. Since a conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by
other evidence, Sec. 77-31-18 U . C . A . 1953, certainly such uncorroborated testimony demanded the Court's most searching questioning as to its truth, coming
from one endeavoring to exonerate himself; should have carried no weight, nor in
any manner been persuasive, so as to justify the Court in sentencing Marvell to
death, when without corroboration it would not have sustained his conviction.
The Utah statute, Section 76-3-207 U. C. A. 1953, by its, failure to p r o vide for specific findings, by either jury or court, upon which a sentence of death
is found warranted; and by its failure to provide for an automatic appeal in the
[7]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

event of the imposition of the death s e n t e n c e ; not to mention its f a i l u r e to s e t
forth any s t a n d a r d s a s t o a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s justifying the death penalty;
the Utah statute fails to m e e t t h e d e m a n d s of G r e g g and P r o f i t , in both of which
c a s e s g r e a t s t r e s s is p l a c e d upon t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s to m e e t the c o n c e r n s of the
Furman case.
Respectfully s u b m i t t e d ,

sSftJ^

C r a i g D e r r i cckson
k s o n IV^OTrve
]\^^i^vell
Appellant
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